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HOW SENSITIVE ARE PRICE SENSITIVE EVENTS? 





ccording to the Portuguese law and in line with the regulatory framework of the majority of 
s are, and 
y, not only concerning stock prices, but 
significant for this purpose by issuers 
itive events classified as such 
 
A
the European capital markets (namely the UK market), security issuers have the obligation to 
reveal, in an appropriate way, publishable information, in order to avoid information 
asymmetry. This information is classified into two categories: the first called “Price Sensitive 
Events” and the second under the designation “Other Events/Communications” and, as it is 
expected, it does not necessarily influence share prices in a material way.  The Portuguese 
regulator (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários) defines its website as the 
appropriate manner to disseminate this publishable information through the market. 
This study aims to find out how price sensitive these revealed price sensitive event
how timely the market reaction to their disclosure is. 
We applied the traditional event studies methodolog
also the trading volume (number of traded shares). Thus, we tested the hypothesis of the 
existence of an abnormal stock price returns and abnormal trading volume around or about the 
day, on which the price sensitive event was disclosed.  
Using a database of 1828 events that were considered 
and collected from the regulators’ website from 01/1/2000 to 31/12/2002, we found an 
average abnormal return of 0.23% on the announcement day with a subsequent price 
stabilization. However, when the sample was split up into good and bad news, we found an 
average abnormal return of +1.92% and –0.93% respectively. Although the return to 
equilibrium proved to be slower with regard to the trading volume, we found that, on average, 
there was an excess of activity around the announcement day. 
We can therefore conclude that the disclosure of price sens
contain useful market information, and that this information is incorporated in an efficient 
way in the share price formation process. However, the release of information seems to be 
done in a delayed way in comparison to what we would expect. 
 
 
Keywords: Price Sensitive Events; Event Studies; Semi-strong Form Efficiency; Abnormal 
EL classification: G14 and G18. 








The turbulence and uncertainty which have characterized the world’s financial markets 
have placed increased attention on fields such as valuation, market efficiency and market 
regulation. On the other hand, globalization and the development of information and 
communications technology have increased the importance of disclosure and regulation in the 
financial sector. 
 
The Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários), created in 1991, is the regulatory body responsible for the regulation and 
regulation and supervision of the Portuguese capital markets. One of its major concerns is to 
guarantee the integrity and transparency of the market. With that purpose in mind, CMVM 
follows some fundamental guidelines with emphasis on the quality of information and the 
contribution to the market’s efficiency and security. In this context, and according to the 
Portuguese Securities Code (CVM – Código dos Valores Mobiliários), security issuers have 
an obligation to inform the market about price sensitive events. They have to inform the 
regulator about price the sensitive event under scope in a timely fashion. The regulator will 
then inform the market, using its diffusion system, which is basically a specific website 
available for this purpose1. 
 
Using these supposed “price sensitive events” that are elected by issuing companies to be 
disclosed through the CMVM website, this study has two related objectives: first to study 
how sensitive are “price sensitive” events and, secondly, how efficient and timely has this 
process been.  
 
With that purpose in mind, we applied the traditional methodology of event studies to test the 
hypothesis of the existence of an abnormal return or abnormal trading volume around or about 
the day, on which the price sensitive event was disclosed. This will enable us to reach a 
conclusion with regard to the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis of the Portuguese equity 
market. 




The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the legal details 
about the duty of price sensitive events’ disclosure. Section 3 presents the literature review. 
Section 4 explains the methodology applied and Section 5 discusses the empirical results. The 
last section contains the conclusions.  
 
 
2. LEGAL ASPECTS 
The Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários) was created in 1991 with the objective of regulating and supervising the 
Portuguese capital market, looking at the integrity and transparency of markets. Stock markets 
need a flow of relevant and timely information in order to work efficiently. The disclosure of 
information for investors is therefore a vital topic in CMVM´s guidelines.  In this context, the 
Portuguese Securities Code (CVM – Código dos Valores Mobiliários) imposes several rules 
on listed companies regarding their information obligations.  
 
Finally, for legal purposes CMVM foresees two categories of publishable information: the 
first called “Price Sensitive Information” and the second under the designation “Other 
Events/Communications” to the market. 
 
Under the “price sensitive events” category the Portuguese Securities Code (article 248 nr.1) 
requires that issuing companies with listed shares should immediately inform the market 
about events that are not of general knowledge and that could have a relevant influence on 
their share prices. A precise definition of “relevant influence” or “price sensitivity” is difficult 
to establish as the rule contains some flexibility and a number of factors relating to a 
particular case need to be taken into account. In this sense, it is important to analyze the 
delimitation of theses concepts in the context of this work. For this purpose we will consider 
the guidelines published by CMVM on the subject. They were published in July 2000, in a 
document entitled “Statement of opinion regarding a legal duty of issuers of securities listed 
on the Stock Exchange to disclose information on material events” (CMVM, 2000a). 
 
In this document, CMVM states that the disclosure obligation of price sensitive events should 
be perceived in a broad sense, i.e. including not only facts/events but also observed changes, 
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deficiencies or inaccuracies, if they are not of public knowledge, that may lead to a substantial 
price change on listed securities. 
 
Secondly, the event to be disclosed should be given to have been finished, not necessarily in a 
formal way, but at least in terms of the management process. Therefore, CMVM considers 
that companies do not have to inform the market about preliminary stages of negotiations or 
internal processes while confidentiality is maintained between the intervening parties.   
 
A further and essential point when assessing whether a matter requires announcement is to 
define what constitutes “price sensitive”. According to CMVM´s guidelines, facts are price 
sensitive if they are expected to lead to a substantial change of share prices. It is therefore 
impossible to set out an automatic way to identify price sensitive information. A variety of 
factors can influence the evaluation of the relevance of the information, since it is based on 
the interpretation of the issuing company. However, some examples of price sensitive events 
are given by the regulator, with the provision that, nevertheless, they can only be considered 
as indicative events that may cause potential price change and, therefore, they do not exempt 
the company from analyzing the relevance of each particular case2.  
 
A further key point is that it is extremely important that the information quickly reaches all 
investors at the same time, avoiding information asymmetry. According to CMVM´s 
regulation (Article 1 of Regulation nr. 11/2000) (CMVM, 2000b) relevant facts should be 
immediately communicated by the issuer to the regulator, which by turn will disclose it 
through its information diffusion system available at its website. Furthermore, the disclosure 
of the price sensitive events should be done after the close of the market, except if, given the 
                                                 
2 Examples of potential material events are: “cooperative or strategic deals; merger, split or transformation of the 
issuer or of other entities which are in a group relationship with the same; restructuring of the liabilities of the 
issuing company or of other entities involved in a group relationship with the same, particularly with regard to 
recovery plans for companies; cessation of activities or of business; modification of the development strategies 
of the issuer; the launch of new product lines or services; technological innovations, particularly the adoption of 
new methods of production; Acts of God, when these could affect the activities of the issuing company and the 
damage from which are not entirely covered by insurance; litigation, when this could affect the assets of the 
issuer or the group of which it is a member; the loss or attainment of clients in such a way as to have an impact 
on the turnover of the issuing company; contracts which are particularly significant to the activities of the issuing 
company; significant holdings in companies whose shares are not listed, particularly with regard to the obtaining 
of synergy and cost-effectiveness in the organisation of the company in question” (CMVM 2000 a). 
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urgency of the information, the opposite is authorized by the regulator. This will be judged on 
the basis of market and issuer interests. 
 
Finally, according to this system, investors can also have access to a wide variety of 
information such as the publication of previously made earnings announcements, the 
acquisition or sale of company’s own shares, and dividend announcements, among others, 
which are classified as “Other Events/Communications”. Once this type of information does 
not follow the criteria previously defined as price sensitive event, it is expected that it does 
not influence security prices in the same way.   
 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Assuming that asset values are determined by the asset expected cash flows, any information 
leading to a change in those expectations is supposed to have a direct influence on the asset 
pricing. The study of how security prices incorporate information has been a dominant topic 
in Finance, and has commonly been studied under the market efficiency scope. As this study 
intends to analyze the impact of the price sensitive events disclosure on stock prices, the 
literature review is based on the research of semi-strong form tests for the adjustment of 
prices to public announcements, currently known as event studies (Fama, 1991). 
  
The seminal study of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) (1969) introduced the event study 
methodology, still in use today to analyze how stock prices incorporate public information. 
Since we aim to analyze the impact of “price sensitive events” which could include a wide 
variety of events such as earning announcements, mergers, tender offers or company 
restructurings, we have chosen only to review the literature on the most frequent type of 
events that occur in our sample3.  Based on the classification presented in Thompson, Olsen 
and Dietrich (1987) and Pritamani and Singal (2001), with the due alterations to our sample, 
we obtained the following categories summarized in Table 3.1: 
 
                                                 
3 Our sample initially included forty four listed companies in Euronext Lisbon from which it was possible to 
collect price series and price sensitive events. As price sensitive events have only been available on CMVM´s 
website since 2000, the period under analysis is between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2002. 
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Table 3-1: Information Classification 
Type Classification 
1 Earning announcements; 
2 Changes in accounting principles/ Information about taxes; 
3 Changes in the composition of the Board of Directors, and/or the Supervisory Board or 
any other supervisory body;  
4 Capital structure related information: dividends, own shares, stock/debt issues; 
5 Restructuring related information: mergers, acquisitions, asset sales; 
6 General business related information: turnover, alliances, new products or services; 
7 Miscellaneous information, not classifiable in the previous categories. 
 
We concluded that, during the considered time window (3 years of observations), the most 
frequent type of information (46%) is on company restructurings, namely acquisitions and 
asset sales. With a considerably lower weight (18%), we have material events related to 
changes in capital structure, namely, share issues and dividend distribution. 
 
A number of studies have examined the effects of the announcements of mergers, tender 
offers or divestitures on share prices. These studies are unanimous in supporting that the 
capital market attributes value to these disclosures. Nevertheless, despite existing consensus 
that such events have a positive influence with regard to shareholders´ target firms, the same 
is not valid for acquiring firms, the conclusions sometimes being contradictory. Jarrel and 
Poulsen (1989), Servaes (1991), and Georgen and Renneboog (2002) identified cumulative 
abnormal returns superior to 20% on target firms. With regard to bidding firms some authors 
argue that the wealth increase is positive (Jarrel and Poulsen (1989), Loderer and Martin 
(1990), Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Gorergen and Renneboog, 2002), while other studies 
indicate that the gain is null or even slightly negative (Servaes (1991), Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992), Kaplan, Weisbach (1992), and Kuipers, Miller and Patel 2002). 
 
With regards to the influence of share issues on share prices, the findings show that, in 
general, prices tend to observe a decline after the disclosure. Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
concluded that abnormal returns are about -2.7% two days following the announcement. 
Using intra-day stock prices data, Barclay and Litzenberger (1987) confirmed the same 
tendency, concluding that the market responds quickly with a 1.3% decline in price fifteen 
minutes after the announcement. 
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As a final example of a market efficiency test, we consider the examination of dividend 
announcements or the so-called Dividend Puzzle (Black, 1976). According to Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), in a perfect capital market, the decision about dividends should be 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, the evidence has shown that companies tend to deliberately follow 
certain strategies (La Porta et al., 2000) that turn the issue into a real puzzle: how do 
companies choose their dividends policy? Some argue that the unexpected changes in 
dividends present a positive correlation with stock-price changes (Ahorony and Swary (1980) 
and Asquith and Mullins, 1983). This finding is justified by the “information signalling 
hypothesis”, dividends being a way of communicating information to the market (Miller and 
Rock (1985), Ofer and Siegel (1987) and Healy and Palepu, 1988). A second approach 
justifies changes in dividends based on the agency cost theory (Jensen (1986), La Porta et. al., 
2000). A third explanation relates to the tax effect, once the differences in taxes can have an 
impact on stock prices (Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafes, 2001).  
 
Regarding price sensitive events in general, Wilton (2002) concludes that earnings 
announcements provoke a substantial change in stock prices in 21.25% of the cases analyzed 
for the Portuguese capital market. However, this disclosure has been only classified as a price 
sensitive event for 5% of cases. 
 
In the U.S., the results obtained regarding the filling out of form 8-K4 show that the 
adjustment of stock prices to this form is small and generally occurs before the form 
disclosure. This seems to be evidence that other types of information disclosure in due time is 
playing the relevant role (Carter and Soo, 1999).  
 
Fleming (2001) analyzed the impact of the “open briefing” process established in the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 19995, however, his results are mixed. While abnormal trading 
volume and volatility are significantly higher during open briefings, abnormal return is not 
significantly different from zero. 
                                                 
4 According to Securities and Exchanges Commission’s rules this form should be filled out in the period five to 
fifteen days after the occurrence of an event considered relevant. 
5 The Australian Stock Exchange established that firms can provide greater information to the market about price 




4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1.  Stock Price Returns Analysis 
4.1.1. Variables Definition 
 
Regarding the publishable information, our purpose is to analyze the impact of the disclosure 
of the supposed price sensitive events, the event date (day zero) being the date when the 
disclosure is made available at the regulator’s website. Following the methodology of 
MacKinlay (1997), we will consider an event window of eleven days, which includes five 
days before the event, the event day, and five days after its disclosure. The choice of this 
period takes into account the need to have a sufficiently large period to capture the market 
reactions around the event day, but not too long in order to avoid other effects or event 
overlaps, which could reduce significantly our sample. Brown and Warner (1985), Carter and 
Soo (1999), Seiler (2000), Kuipers, Miller and Patel (2002),and Duque and Fazenda (2003) 
used similar time periods. 
 
We used the market model to measure the expected (normal) performance, with the PSI Geral 
as a proxy to the market portfolio. The PSI Geral Index is a performance equity index, which 
considers all stocks listed in the Euronext Lisbon. We used daily prices for estimating daily 
stock returns and like Beaver (1968), Oppong (1980) and Isidro (1997), we considered all 
trading days from 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2002 excluding those within the event window. 
Therefore, we assumed that, firstly, the model’s parameters were anticipated by the market 
and, secondly, they were constant during the analyzed period.        
 
The abnormal return of security i in the event window is defined as follows: 
mtiiitit Rβ - α  RAR ˆˆ−=  
where and are market model parameter estimatesiα̂ iβ̂
6,  and itR mtR  are, respectively, the 
period t returns on security i and the market index. 
 
                                                 
6 Ordinary least squares (OLS) were used for the estimation procedure. 
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Under the null hypothesis (H0) that the event has no impact on the behaviour of stock price 
returns, the distribution of the sample abnormal return of a given observation in the event 
window is assumed to be: 





 σARσ it ε=  
Nevertheless, it is usual to aggregate through time and across securities (MacKinlay, 1997) in 
order to draw overall inferences for the event under scope. 
 
Considering the aggregation through time, we arrive at the Cumulative Abnormal Return 









iti AR ) ,t(tCAR  
The distribution of cumulative abnormal return is 
( ) ( )( )( )21221 0 ,ttCAR, σ ~ N,ttCAR iii  
where, 
( )( ) ( 212212 1 i  -tt ,ttCARσ ii εσ+= )  
On the other hand, it is also common to aggregate abnormal returns across observations. 
Considering N events and assuming that there is no overlapping of event windows for the 
included securities, we can estimate the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) which can be 










The average abnormal return could also be aggregated along the event window, leading to the 
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Inferences about the cumulative abnormal returns can be drawn assuming: 
( ) ( )( )( )2121 ,var0 ttCAAR,  ~ N,ttCAAR  
where, 
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Then, the null hypothesis (Ho) of the event having no impact on stock price returns can be 





















In order to test if our conclusions could be biased as a consequence of an inadequate model 
for testing abnormal returns, we also used the market adjusted model, where abnormal returns 
are taken as:  
iitit R  RAR −=  
where iR  is the daily average returns for the security i for the estimation period. 
 
4.1.2. Average Abnormal Return Analysis – Good and Bad News 
 
Several authors such as Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) have pointed out theoretical 
reasons for different stock price reactions to good and bad news, and empirical findings have 
proven such theories. Therefore, we may also suspect different behaviours for stock price 
reactions to good and bad news. 
 
Since the classification of price sensitive events as good and bad news is subjective, we 
assumed that the market is efficient regarding the incorporation of information and as in 
Cristie, Corwin and Harris (2002), we used the following criteria in order to classify events: 
 When the return of security i in the event date (day zero) was positive, we classified 
the price sensitive event as “good news”; 
 When the return of security i in the event date (day zero) was negative, we classified 
the price sensitive event as “bad news”. 
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Therefore, all tests presented in section 4.1.1 were repeated considering this classification, 
using the notations  and  for good news andGΘ1 GΘ2  BΘ1  and BΘ2  for bad news. 
 
4.1.3. Average Abnormal Return Analysis – “Other Events” 
 
Since it is not possible to set out a formula to define automatically what should be disclosed 
as price sensitive events, companies could find it difficult to decide what to announce and 
when. Thus, we could frequently have events that, despite leading to substantial movement in 
the stock price, are not classified as price sensitive. However, they are also disclosed and 
made available at the regulator’s website under the denomination of “Other 
Events/Communications”. In this context, we considered it pertinent to carry out all tests 
previously presented not only with regard to price sensitive events but also with regard to 
“Other Events/Communications” in order to analyze if these disclosures also lead to any 
significant change in stock prices.    
 
 
4.2. Trading Volume Analysis 
4.2.1. Volume Ratio 
 
In addition to stock price returns analysis, we also carried out tests to determine the impact of 
price sensitive events in stock trading volumes in order to complement the results previously 
obtained. The Harris and Gurel (1986) methodology was first applied. In this study, the 
abnormal trading volume is measured by the determination of adjusted market volume ratio 










  VR =  
where  and itV mtV  are the trading volume of, respectively, security i and the market index at 
the event window t, and  and  are the average trading volumes of, respectively, security 
i and the market index, during the estimation period. The expected value of this ratio is 1 if 














In this study,  represents the trading volume for all listed companies included in our 
sample (Landsman and Maydew, 2001) and the estimation period includes all trading 
volumes from 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2002, excluding the event window. 
mV
 
According to Beaver (1968), Landsman and Maydew (2001), Cready and Mynatt (1991) and 
Chae (2002), the measure used to determine the trading volume is7: 
t i
ti   Vit day in  firmfor  goutstandin shares of nr.
day in  traded firm of shares of nr.
=  
However, as referred to in Deininger, Kaserer and Ross (2000), the number of outstanding 
stocks does not often correspond to the number of stocks available for trading at the stock 
exchange. Hence, volume should be measured in relation to the number of free-floating stocks 
and not outstanding shares. Nevertheless, as it was not possible to obtain this information for 
the period under analysis, we based our estimates on the amount of outstanding shares as in 
the studies mentioned above. 
 
4.2.2. Abnormal Trading Volume Analysis 
 
Additionally, an analysis to obtain the abnormal trading volume was carried out through 
similar tests to those presented in section 4.1.1, using the notation MMΘ . Thus, the abnormal 
trading volume (AVOL) for any security i in the event window is: 
mtiiitit Vβ  α  VAVOL
ˆˆ −−=  
where and are parameters estimates of the linear regression: iα̂ iβ̂
itmtiiit  ε V β  αV ++=  
 where itV  is the trading volume for the security i on day t, mtV  is the total trading volume for 
all securities included in the sample and and are the regression model parameters. iα iβ
                                                 
7 See Lo and Wang (2000) for a more detailed description of volume measures. 
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Assuming the normality, statistical tests presented above were computed regarding trading 
volume. 
 
The variable volume applied in tests was similar to the one presented in Ajinkya and Jain 
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Finally, we also carried out tests considering the mean adjusted trading volume, where the 






it V -  V AVOL =  
where  is the logarithm of the trading volume of security i on day t and *itV
*
iV  is the average 





4.3.1. Price Sensitive Events 
 
Data on daily closing prices and trading volumes of companies listed in the Euronext Lisbon 
between January 2000 and December 2002 were collected using Dathis.9 It was possible to 
collect data for the entire time period under analysis for forty four out of fifty four companies 
that were listed on 31/12/2002. 
 
                                                 
8 In order to avoid the problem related to the day on which the security was not traded (logarithm of zero) a 
constant of 0.00000255 is added to the trading volume as described in Cready and Mynatt (1991). This constant 
is chosen in order to maximize the normality of trading volume distribution.    
9 Dathis is the brand name of the Euronext Lisbon database. 
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Nevertheless, the estimation process of the parameters of the market model led to the 
exclusion of seven securities, because the estimated parameters were statistically 
insignificant. Thus, the final sample was composed of thirty seven companies, which 
represent about 86% of market capitalization computed on 31/12/2002. 
 
In order to compute the abnormal return using the market model, we also collected data from 
a Portuguese stock market index for the same time period. We chose the PSI Geral since it is 
a market wide performance equity index, includes all listed securities on the Euronext Lisbon, 
and is adjusted for dividends and stock splits. 
 
We collected price sensitive events available at the regulator website (http://www.cmvm.pt). 
The initial sample of 798 price sensitive events of forty four companies was reduced to 757 
events as result of the insignificance of the market model parameters when discussing their 
estimate. 
 
Finally, it should be stressed that overlapping of event windows was taken into consideration. 
Therefore, when announcements occurred on consecutive days, or within less than a five-day 
time interval, it was assumed as a single event and the “event day” was assumed to consist of 
the entire time interval between the day of first event and the day of the last event. The 
application of this criterion reduced the sample to 509 announcements. 
     
A similar process was also applied to events classified as “Other Events/Communications”. 
Starting with 1030 collected announcements of “Other Events/Communications”, the sample 
was reduced to 962 events due to the estimation process, and we ended up with 471 events 
after submission of the initial sample to the criterion detailed above. Table 4.1 details the 
steps for obtaining the final sample. 
 
Table 4-1 Effect of Selection Criteria upon Sample Size 





Initial sample size (events of 44 companies) 798 1030 1828 
OLS parameters estimates criteria - 41 - 68 - 109 
Reduced sample size (37 companies) 757 962 1719 
Overlapping data (event windows criteria) - 248 - 491 - 739 




5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1. Return Analysis 
5.1.1.  Expected Returns 
The market model was applied to all securities included in the initial sample. Some summary 
statistics relating to these regressions are shown in Table 5.1: 
Table 5-1: Summary of Regression Statistics Return Analysis  
 Average Standard Deviation Max. Min. 
     
Average Daily Return -0.05% 1.06% 0.15% -4.85% 
Average  (2iR
2
iR ) 0.12 0.15 0.69 0.01 
Average iβ  ( β ) 0.61 0.44 1.92 0.07 
 
The coefficient of determination R2 is higher than 0.3 in only five of the thirty-seven analyzed 
securities. The average value for this coefficient is only 0.12, which is close to the estimation 
found by Brown and Warner (1985). The average iβ  is 0.61, which substantially differs from 
1. This is quite unexpected since we selected a sample representative of the entire market. 
Nevertheless, the average beta was computed as a non-weighted average of thirty seven 
companies and additionally the PSI Geral included fifty four companies on 31/12/2002.  
 
Different assumptions underlie the linear regression model computed according to the OLS 
methodology, such as: stock price returns should be linearly related to the market index and 
the daily abnormal returns should be independent and identically distributed with a constant 
variance and following a normal distribution. Thus, some statistical tests were conducted in 
order to assess the statistical properties of our daily database. Results are presented in Table 
5.2 and are very similar to those observed by Coutts, Mills and Robert (1995) when studying 
weekly data of fifty six companies belonging to the FT-SE 100, between January 1984 and 





Table 5-2: Misspecification tests of the Market Model of the sample collected   
Statistical Tests p>0.05 0.05≥p>0.025 0.025≥p>0.01 p<0.01 
LM(1) 15 1 0 21 
KS 2 0 1 34 
White 23 2 0 12 
Reset 29 1 0 7 
Font: Table adapted from the study of Coutts, Mills e Roberts (1995) 
 
It is clear that in several cases the underlying assumptions of the market model are not 
verified. Nearly 60% of the regressions present evidence of residual autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity is present in a third of the regressions and about 22% suffer from non-
linearity. However, the non-normality seems to be the main problem, since only two 
regressions displayed evidence of normality. In the other cases, the non-normality is 
expressed by the excess Kurtosis. 
 
Nevertheless, as referred to in Brown and Warner (1985), “the Central Limit Theorem 
guarantees that if the excess returns in the cross-section of securities are independent and 
identically distributed drawings from finite variance distributions, the distribution of the 
sample mean excess return converges to normality as the number of securities increases”. For 
a sample of fifty companies, the authors conclude that the mean excess return converges to 
normality. 
 
On the other hand, Brown and Warner (1985) also concluded that the improvement resulting 
from tests that introduce corrections to variance in order to correct autocorrelation are small. 
 
Therefore, despite the eventual problems that can occur in classical event studies 
methodology, Brown and Warner (1985) support that results of simulations performed with 
daily data reinforce the conclusions already presented in Brown and Warner (1980) with 
monthly data, with those tests correctly specified. 
 
5.1.2. Abnormal Returns – Price Sensitive Events 
 
After analyzing average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns across the 
event window (Figures 5.1 and 5.2), it seems that a significant change is observed around day 
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zero with an increase of the stock price returns on this day and followed by a decrease on the 
subsequent days. 
 



















Figure 5-2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return – Price Sensitive Events 
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These results can be confirmed by the analysis of the statistical tests described earlier, with 









Table 5-3: Results of Tests to AAR and CAAR – Price Sensitive Events 
Day AAR 
 
Test Θ1 CAAR 
 
Test Θ2
-5 0.00% 0.00086 0.00% 0.00086 
-4 -0.07% -0.65793 -0.07% -0.46462 
-3 -0.07% -0.64395 -0.14% -0.75115 
-2 0.05% 0.51300 -0.08% -0.39401 
-1 -0.02% -0.16043 -0.10% -0.42416 
0 0.23% 2.20498* 0.13% 0.51297 
1 -0.04% -0.34058 0.10% 0.34619 
2 -0.05% -0.43489 0.05% 0.17008 
3 -0.07% -0.63634 -0.02% -0.05176 
4 -0.04% -0.39143 -0.06% -0.17289 
5 -0.12% -1.13236 -0.18% -0.50626 
* Parameters statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
 
Focusing on the event day (day 0), the sample average abnormal return is 0.23%, which 
together with a standard error of 0.125% results in a value of 2.2 for test Θ1. Thus, the null 
hypothesis that the event has no impact is rejected with a 95% confidence level. On the other 
days, the hypothesis that the variable is null is accepted with the same degree of confidence. 
 
However, when we analyze the evolution of the cumulative average abnormal return along the 
event window, despite the increase observed on day 0, the statistical test does not identify any 
abnormal return. In this context, we ran the corresponding test but distinguishing between 
“good” and “bad” news. Results can be observed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4: 
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The results obtained and the statistical tests confirm the conclusions shown in previous 
figures and are presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5: 
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Table 5-4: Results of AAR Tests – “Good and Bad News” – Price Sensitive Events 
“Good News” “Bad News” 
Day AAR Θ1G test AAR Θ1B test 
-5 0.12% 0.78870 -0.06% -0.44853 
-4 -0.10% -0.63550 -0.06% -0.44092 
-3 -0.08% -0.50106 -0.12% -0.85741 
-2 -0.04% -0.23102 0.14% 1.01137 
-1 -0.10% -0.66194 -0.02% -0.13410 
0 1.94% 12.27185* -0.93% -6.67649* 
1 -0.13% -0.84187 0.00% -0.00920 
2 -0.02% -0.13694 -0.06% -0.45622 
3 -0.04% -0.23544 -0.11% -0.75395 
4 0.03% 0.16424 -0.10% -0.73844 
5 -0.06% -0.35681 -0.14% -0.97593 
* Parameters statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Table 5-5: Results CAAR Tests – “Good and Bad News” – Price Sensitive Events 
“Good News” “Bad News” 
Day CAAR Θ2G test  CAAR Θ2B test 
-5 0.12% 0.78870 -0.06% -0.44853 
-4 0.02% 0.10833 -0.12% -0.62894 
-3 -0.05% -0.20084 -0.24% -1.00856 
-2 -0.09% -0.28944 -0.10% -0.36775 
-1 -0.20% -0.55491 -0.12% -0.38890 
0 1.74% 4.50340* -1.05% -3.08068* 
1 1.61% 3.85114* -1.06% -2.85563* 
2 1.59% 3.55400* -1.12% -2.83250* 
3 1.55% 3.27226* -1.22% -2.92182* 
4 1.58% 3.15627* -1.33% -3.00540* 
5 1.52% 2.90181* -1.46% -3.15979* 
   * Parameters statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
 
 
The results are consistent with a great majority of the literature on the market efficiency in its 
semi-strong form. The evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that price sensitive events do 
indeed convey useful information for the determination of stock prices. We can conclude that 
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the market quickly incorporates the information during day 0 and evidence of abnormal 
returns on subsequent days does not exist. 
 
Nevertheless, we have to consider that day 0 represents the date on which the issuer 
communicates the event, and according to the Rules and Regulations, this communication 
should happen out of trading hours. This means that there is evidence of some existing 
abnormal returns before the disclosure of the event to the market and if tests were developed 
using intra-day data, conclusions of market inefficiency could be obtained. 
 
Two reasons can justify this finding. On one hand, with the authorization of the regulator 
(CMVM) some events can be disclosed during trading hours when the urgency of information 
release is crucial to the market. This would lead to an immediate adjustment of stock prices in 
day 0 and therefore, closing prices used to compute the event day stock price return are prices 
already “corrected” by the market. On the other hand, in other cases, even when the 
announcements are released after the market close, they simply represent a correction to or a 
clarification of any incorrect or insufficient information that was disturbing the market before 
their release. In these situations prices were already affected by the information although it 
was not yet official. Thus it is under these circumstances that we detect signs of some 
information asymmetry leading to some suggestion of semi-strong form of inefficiency. 
 
It is also interesting to notice that in our sample, collected in a bear market10, the largest 
impacts on stock prices were observed when the announcements were classified as “good 
news”. On the event day, the change observed in the average abnormal return was 2% for 
“good news” but only 0.95% for “bad news”. These conclusions are consistent with the 
results observed by Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002), who, when studying price changes 
to “good” and “bad” news concerning earning announcements, found that prices tend to react 
less to “good” news when the market is increasing, and inversely when the market is falling. 
 
The conclusions using the abnormal return from the mean adjusted return are consistent with 
those from the market model. 
 
                                                 
10 In 2001 the Portuguese stock index PSI – 20 registered a fall of 25.73% and in 2002 a fall of 25.62%. 
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5.1.3. Abnormal Returns – Other Communications 
 
The results for “Other Events/Communications” reveal that the disclosure of this type of 
announcement also affects stock prices around the event day as we can observe in Figures 5.5 
and 5.6: 
Figure 5-5: Average Abnormal Return – “Other Communications” 
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However, the tests obtained for the cumulative average abnormal return of “good news” are 
statistically insignificant at a 5% significance level. Despite the results being not so obvious 
than with price sensitive events, we observed that “Other Events/Communications” also 
possess informational value. Since it is not possible to automatically distinguish between 
“Price Sensitive Events” and “Other Events / Communications” our findings may well be the 
result of wrongly subjective classification within this category as suggested by Wilton (2002). 
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5.2. Stock Trading Volume 
5.2.1. Adjusted Volume Ratio 
 
As observed in Figure 5.7 and Table 5.6, the trading volume increases around day 0 with 
larger significance on the day following the disclosure of the price sensitive information (the 
first day on which trading is possible after the event). On average, volume on day 1 is twice 
the daily mean volume over the estimation period, revealing a significant increase of activity 
in the market during this time period. 











Table 5-6: Market Adjusted Volume Ratio 

















5.2.2.  Average Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
Figure 5.8 and Table 5.7 show that the AAVOL increases on day 0, showing an excess of 
activity around the event day. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, contrary to what 
happened with stock price returns, the return to the average trading volume proved to be 
slower. On day 3 we can still observe a statistically significant average abnormal trading 
volume. 
 
Figure 5-8: Average Abnormal Trading Volume – Market Model 
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Table 5-7: Results of AAVOL test – Price Sensitive Events 
Day AAVOL ΘMM test  
-5 0.0191 0.3368 
-4 0.0571 1.0044 
-3 -0.0301 -0.5292 
-2 0.0189 0.3329 
-1 0.0031 0.0543 
0 0.1787  3.1432* 
1 0.2502  4.4010* 
2 0.1329  2.3385* 
3 0.1576  2.7723* 
4 0.0575 1.0119 
5 0.0103 0.1816 
                                * Parameters statistically significant at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Combining the results of the analysis of stock price returns with the results on trading volume, 
we can conclude that the disclosure of price sensitive events leads, on average, to a substantial 
change of these two variables. Nevertheless, while the prices seem to revert quickly to their 
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expected returns after the announcement, the same does not happen with trading volume. On 
the subsequent days, a significant excess of activity still persists. This result reinforces the 
idea that the changes observed in prices are not due to supply and demand imbalances, but 
seem to be the result of changes in equilibrium prices, i.e. changes in future expected cash-
flows as a result of the released news. At the new prices new agents are attracted to trading, 
namely liquidity traders, as defined in Copeland and Galai (1986). 
 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that these results are compatible with the definition of 
information content presented in Beaver (1968). A substantial impact is observed around the 
event day, not only on returns but also on trading volume, concluding that the information 






In the competitive environment that characterizes today’s capital markets, the transparency of 
the price formation process is crucial in order to build up investor’s confidence that recently 
has been deeply shaken after the Enron or the Worldcom scandals. Thus, the disclosure of 
information to the market constitutes a fundamental pillar not only for market workflow but 
also in its regulation and supervision activity. In this context and with the purpose of leading 
to greater integrity and market transparency, regulators have increased the pressure on listed 
companies for information disclosure of price sensitive events. This pressure applies to both 
the detail and quality of the information to be disclosed, and the timing of their 
announcements. 
 
In this work we intend to analyze the relevance of the disclosure of price sensitive events in 
the Portuguese stock market, with the purpose of determining if the disclosure of such 
information is efficiently incorporated into stock prices. It is our additional intention to reach 
a conclusion on the speed of any price adjustments that may be recorded.  
 
With that purpose in mind, we used the traditional event studies methodology applied to the 
analysis of the average abnormal return (AAR), as well as its cumulative value along the 
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event window. According to MacKinlay (1997), the abnormal return is calculated as the 
difference between the return of a security and its expected return computed through the 
market model. After the splitting of events into “good” news and “bad” news, the results 
demonstrate an average abnormal return around day 0, and a subsequent fast return to 
equilibrium. Thus, for the sample collected and considering the inherent limitations, we can 
conclude that the disclosure of price sensitive events possesses informational value and that 
the market is efficient in its semi-strong form. Nevertheless, considering that announcements 
are made after the close of trade in the exchange, the adjustment in prices seems prior to the 
disclosure, which may indicate that in several cases the announcements are mere rectifications 
or simple validations of rumours already spreading around. 
 
These results are confirmed with a similar analysis regarding trading volume. In this case, an 
average abnormal volume is also observed around day 0. However, the return to equilibrium 
is slower, observing an excess of activity until the third day after the announcement. Hence, 
after prices return to equilibrium, investors continue to adjust their portfolios, maintaining a 
high level of market activity. 
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